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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ER 10-1707 7 March 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary

National Security Council

SUBJECT

Revision of National Security Council Intelligence

Directive No. 4

REFERENCE

: Your memorandum dated 29 January 1957, subject: Report to the President by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities,

dated December 20, 1956

1. Following their review of the draft National Security Council Intelligence Directives submitted to the Executive Secretary on 28 January 1958, the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities recommended that NSCID No. 4 | be reduced in length and that procedural details be transferred to a Director of Central Intelligence Directive.

The enclosed condensed version of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 4 has been approved by the Intelligence Advisory Committee with the understanding that all provisions which formerly appeared in the long form draft, and which have either been deleted entirely from the condensed version or appear there in summary form only, will be incorporated without substantive change in appropriate Director of Central Intelligence Directives.

Attachment as stated

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: JUL 2006

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
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
Revised Draft Concurred in by the IAC 7 March 1958

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 4\*

\*This Directive supersedes NSCID No. 13, dated 19 January 1950, and NSCID No. 14, dated 3 March 1950.

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DRAFT
Concurred in by the USCIB
3 January 1958
Concurred in by the IAC
21 January 1958

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 6\*

"ELECTRONICS INTELLIGENCE" (ELINT)

Pursuant to Sections 101 and 102, as amended, of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

The following organization and procedures are hereby established in order that Electronics Intelligence, hereinafter called ELINT, may be made most effective.

- 1. Definition: The term ELINT is defined as the collection (observation and recording), and the technical processing for subsequent intelligence purposes, of information derived from foreign, non-communications, electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than atomic detonation or radioactive sources.
- 2. The United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB), in addition to its authority and responsibility as defined in other NSCIDs and operating under the procedures established therein, shall be the national policy body for ELINT, including policy in relation to the Technical Processing Center provided by paragraph 4, below, arrangements with foreign governments in the field of ELINT, and recommendations concerning research and development requirements.

<sup>\*</sup>This Directive supersedes NSCID No. 17 of 5/16/55.



- 3. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2, above, the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency shall be responsible for their respective ELINT collection activities.
- 4. The technical processing of all ELINT shall be accomplished in a center to be organized and administered by the Department of Defense. However, parallel processing may be accomplished for essential operational or tactical purposes. This center shall be jointly staffed by individuals detailed from the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency in a proportion to be determined by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence.
- 5. All data collected by the collection agencies shall be made available forthwith to the Technical Processing Center, subject only to minimum delays necessitated by prior exploitation in the field for urgent tactical or operational purposes.
- 6. The Technical Processing Center shall effect fullest and most expeditious processing possible and furnish the results thereof to the interested departments and agencies, and to the extent practicable, in the form desired by them.

ER 10-610

28 January 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary

National Security Council

SUBJECT

Recommended New National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 7 - Critical Intelligence Communications

REFERENCES

- (a) Memorandum for DCI and ES/NSC, dated 28 October 1957, Subject: Recommendation No. 1, Report of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, dated 24 October 1957.
- (b) Memorandum for ES/NSC from DCI, Serial TS #141662/a, IAC-D-114/1, dated 6 December 1957, subject as above.
- 1. The United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) has completed a study of measures which might be undertaken immediately to improve the quality of communications service necessary to provide the President and the National Security Council more timely service on critical intelligence, particularly that related to prior warning of Soviet attack.
- 2. At the present time the intelligence community is primarily dependent upon the communications capabilities of the Military Services, and the Department of State for the electrical transmission of intelligence between intelligence collection sources and intelligence users.


  the networks used,

  are common-user networks where intelligence must compete for circuit time and priority of handling with the communications needs of other users. The communications facilities and services currently available for use by the intelligence community are not adequate to provide for the consistent transmission of critical intelligence on a timely basis.
- 3. The Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) has stated that, because of the growing Soviet missile capability, the intelligence community should have communications available which can provide speed of service. USCIB does not believe that such a service can be provided by mid-1958 except in unusual circumstances, but does believe that substantial improvement can be made immediately.

4. Certain overseas relay centers and communications channels currently provided for the use of the National Security Agency

are suitable for transmitting all-source intelligence and, if augmented and improved, could provide the basis for improved intelligence communications.

- 5. Preliminary estimates of costs of augmenting and improving communications have been made.
  - a. The estimated one-time cost of an immediate improvement program for overseas relay centers is and the estimated annual cost of additional communications channels necessary to augment existing available channels is In addition to the above, funds would be required by the intelligence agencies in Fiscal Year 1959 to interconnect with the relay centers since none of the agencies has budgeted for this item.
  - b. A long-range program for automation, which is considered to be the logical goal for adequate service, is estimated to require a one-time expenditure of including equipment for the relay centers. It is estimated that the annual recurring cost for operation and maintenance of such a system would be
    - c. No funds have been budgeted for these purposes.
- 6. USCIB and the IAC consider that the following actions must be accomplished if the intelligence community is to have communications support necessary to insure timely transmission of critical intelligence.
  - a. The designation of an Executive Agent for the Government to provide for the establishment, operation, and perfection of communications means necessary to insure adequate transmission of critical intelligence.
  - b. The designation of a single authority at the national level to provide the Executive Agent of the Government with continuing guidance as to the communications requirements of the intelligence community for the transmission of critical intelligence.
  - c. The designation of a single authority to define critical intelligence, and to establish uniform criteria for the identification, selection, and designation of relative priority for transmission of critical intelligence.



- d. The provision of funds, manpower, and resources specifically allocated, over and above those required for any other national defense program, for the establishment, operation, and perfection of communications means to handle critical intelligence.
- 7. USCIB and the IAC have jointly concluded that, in order to accomplish these actions, it will be necessary for the NSC to:
  - a. Designate the Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent of the Government to provide for the establishment, operation, and perfection of communications means necessary to insure adequate transmission of critical intelligence.
  - b. Direct the Director of Central Intelligence, with the advice and support of the members of the IAC, to provide the Secretary of Defense with continuing guidance as to the communications requirements of the intelligence community for the transmission of critical intelligence.
  - c. Direct the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the members of the IAC, to define critical intelligence, and to establish uniform criteria for the identification, selection, and designation of relative priority for the transmission of critical intelligence.
  - d. Support the Secretary of Defense in obtaining supplementary appropriations for the purpose of augmenting and improving communications needed for the transmission of critical intelligence.

8. USCIB and the IAC have jointly concurred in my recommendation that the National Security Council approve the enclosed National Security Council Intelligence Directive.

Director

Attachment

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DRAFT Concurred in by USCIB 22 January 1958 Concurred in by the IAC 28 January 1958

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 7 CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNICATIONS

Pursuant to Sections 101 and 102, as amended, of the National Security Act of 1947, the National Security Council authorizes and directs that:

The following organization and procedures are hereby established so that the communicating of critical intelligence may be made most effective in order that the President and other members of the National Security Council may receive, in the most timely manner, intelligence necessary for action.

- 1. There shall be established communications means for the transmission of critical intelligence, particularly that related to early warning of Soviet attack, necessary to the President and high government officials. These means shall consist of tributary lines linking certain overseas intelligence sources of the intelligence community to overseas relay centers at key locations. The overseas relay centers shall in turn be connected to a communications center and distribution system in the Washington area serving the highest authorities.
- 2. The Secretary of Defense shall be the Executive Agent of the Government to provide for the establishment, operation, and perfection of communications means necessary to ensure adequate transmission of critical intelligence. The Executive Agent of the Government shall be responsible for the establishment, operation, and perfection of the Washington and

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overseas relay centers, the Washington terminals serving the highest authorities, and the interconnecting communications channels. He shall also ensure that, to the extent practicable, intelligence sources overseas are connected with the relay centers designated by him for the relay of critical intelligence.

- 3. The Director of Central Intelligence, with the advice and support of the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, shall provide the Secretary of Defense with continuing guidance as to the communications requirements of the intelligence community for the transmission of critical intelligence.
- 4. The Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, shall define critical intelligence and establish uniform criteria for the identification, selection, and designation of relative priority for the transmission of critical intelligence.